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In Search of Connections: Reading Between the Lines of Nicola Lacey’s In Search of 
Criminal Responsibility 
 
Sharon Cowan* 
 
Abstract 
 
Through the lens of feminist legal theory, this essay aims to draw out the connections 
between Lacey’s In Search of Criminal Responsibility, and her other work and the work of 
interlocutors, on issues relating to law and gender. Lacey’s work is placed into conversation 
with a broader community of ideas that challenge dominant discourses, not only in theory, 
but also in academic institutions and practices themselves. In doing so, the essay highlights 
the importance of taking critical approaches to law—and life—seriously. 
 
Introduction 
 
Lacey’s book In Search of Criminal Responsibility (henceforth ISCR) has been reviewed 
many times by various eminent scholars.1 This review essay focuses on the way in which 
ISRC complements and advances other work in the field of criminal responsibility, and 
beyond. It goes without saying that the book is deliciously ambitious and intellectually 
provocative in its challenge to historical and jurisprudential accounts of responsibility, and to 
some degree accounts of criminal law more generally.  
                                                     
* Professor of Feminist and Queer Legal Studies, University of Edinburgh, Scotland. I would 
like to thank the Edinburgh Criminal Law Reading Group for helpful discussion of Nicola 
Lacey’s book In Search of Criminal Responsibility in 2016-17, and Marcus Dubber and 
Simon Stern for inviting me to be part of this book forum. I would also like to sincerely thank 
Nicola Lacey herself, for her presentation to the Criminal Law Reading Group in March 
2017, and more generally for all her contributions to a broad range of academic and political 
conversations that have inspired and encouraged me for many years. 
1 See for example: Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Of Weevils and Witches: What Can We Learn 
from the Ghost of Responsibility Past?, 101 Va. L. Rev. 947 (2015) (reviewing an earlier 
article of Lacey’s that formed part of ISCR); Ngaire Naffine, Criminal Conversations: 
Farmer, Lacey and the New Social Scholarship, 38 Syd. L. Rev. 505 (2016); Elies Van 
Sliedregt, Book Review, Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests 
and Institutions, 21 Theor. Criminology 400 (2017); Chloë Kennedy, Nicola Lacey, In 
Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions, 21 Edinb. L. Rev. 133 
(2017); Caroline Henaghan, Book Review, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, 
Interests and Institutions, by Nicola Lacey, LSE Review of Books (2017), 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lsereviewofbooks/2017/05/09/book-review-in-search-of-criminal-
responsibility-ideas-interests-and-institutions-by-nicola-lacey/; Daniel Bansal, Book Review, 
Nicola Lacey: In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions, [AU: 
Please insert volume number] Crim. L. & Phil. 1 (2016). This book review has only been 
published online so far so has a DOI number rather than a volume number: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-016-9406-5  
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 Some reviewers concentrate on the spaces within the text that could have been filled 
with their own interests and ideas that could contribute to contemporary debates on the 
concept of responsibility. I am neither a historian, nor someone who has contributed to these 
responsibility conversations. Through the lens of feminist legal theory, my aim in this essay 
is to read between the lines of Lacey’s text, in order to illuminate the relationships between 
this volume and Lacey’s other work, as well as those of her immediate interlocutors; but also 
to draw into the conversation those whose work we might not think of as being in the same 
conversation. This technique will draw out a slightly different community of ideas within 
which Lacey’s work is grounded, but will also highlight the potential for broader 
conversations with other feminist scholars struggling with conceptual and practical questions 
about law and life, and about the nature of academic discourse about those questions.  
 Before undertaking this passeggiata, I will set out briefly the main tenets of Lacey’s 
book.  
 
I. Searching for Responsibility 
 
Building on the work of historians, Lacey book excavates “decisive moments of change” that 
have shaped our understanding of responsibility over time. The abstract for the book suggests 
that ISCR builds on her wonderful 2008 book Women, Crime, and Character (WCC),2 a 
characteristically interdisciplinary analysis of the fundamental shifts in notions of female 
criminality in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 Responsibility is a key legal concept, because, says Lacey, it serves a distinctive role 
in legitimating the exercise of state power through criminal law. Importantly for Lacey, it is 
not so much that the concept of responsibility structures and organizes criminalization 
practices, but also that practices of criminalization inform and shape legal concepts such as 
responsibility. Therefore, the notion of responsibility cannot be understood without also 
examining the important social context of ideas, interests and institutions: understanding 
these three spheres of environment that shape ideas of responsibility allows for political and 
social influences and frameworks to come to the fore; and highlights the overlapping, 
contrasting and conflicting roles that different conceptions of responsibility can play at any 
one time. 
 For Lacey then, there is no one theory of responsibility, and, as she takes great pains 
to argue in chapter 6, there is no point in theorizing about responsibility to a level of 
generality that removes the analysis from any connection to its subject in the real world. She 
critiques those theorists who concentrate solely on the moral foundations of the criminal law, 
and search for universal concepts and definitions that are ahistorical or too abstract from the 
“real world.” Responsibility is not, for Lacey, a “fixed star.”3  
 Lacey recognizes the efforts of some criminal law theorists, such as HLA Hart, to 
engage with both the concepts and practices of criminal law. But while Lacey points out 
(177) the flaws in Hart’s “middle order” theorizing (i.e., attending to both the practical 
                                                     
2 Nicola Lacey, Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles (2008).  
3 Ferzan, supra note 1, at 956. 
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realities of criminal law as well as striving for overarching grounding principles), she herself 
seems to call for some meso-level analytical approach. Lacey wants us to retain the idea that 
conceptual ideas about responsibility can be explored, but not at the expense of socio-legal, 
historical findings, i.e., that law’s modality can never be truly separable from its 
functionality. As a “normative device” (203), responsibility can be seen, by way of “reflexive 
movement” (202), to have core themes across a range of social institutions, rather than as a 
singular concept that spans time and space. This chimes with the work of Brian Tamanaha, 
who has gone to some lengths to critique the analytical philosophers who espouse theories of 
law that aim to identify universal, necessary and essential truths about law.4 Tamanaha 
underlines the importance of “social legal theories,” suggesting that “theories that center on 
law within social and historical contexts . . . have been all but banished from jurisprudence.”5 
In other words, jurisprudential analyses of the criminal law need to be realistic, in the sense 
that conceptual accounts must have some empirical resonance with the social, political and 
cultural nature of criminal law.  
 This is also a somewhat parallel claim to that made by Lindsay Farmer in his recent 
book Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order.6 Farmer argues 
that normative theories of criminalization have likewise been abstracted from the institutional 
features of criminal law, and neglect sociological analyses as well as the all-important 
practices of criminalization (such as the use of police powers, prosecution and enforcement 
of law). His aim is to bring together the normative and empirical dimensions of 
criminalization.7 Linking the development of responsibility to the development of 
criminalization, Farmer suggests that contrary to contemporary criminal law theory that 
positions responsibility as an independent constraint on criminalization (via mens rea), the 
development of different ideas about responsibility have helped to define the scope of what 
can be criminalized, and hence the shape of the criminal law itself.8 Like Lacey, he sees 
responsibility as central to the modality of law, and as a normative tool, or means to an end 
(which for Farmer, is the securing of civil order).9 Again, it is the practices and legal 
institutionalization of responsibility, rather than responsibility as a moral concept, that mold 
the structure and scope of the criminal law. 
 Lacey’s book therefore sits within this community of ideas that challenge any 
representation of law generally, or its key concepts such as responsibility, as universal or 
separable from a socio-historical analysis; and she looks more to the practices, meanings and 
functions of law within its socio-political context rather than an abstract evaluation of its 
moral contours.10 
                                                     
4 Brian Z. Tamanaha, Necessary and Universal Truths About Law?, 30 Ratio Juris 3 (2017); 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (2017) [hereinafter A Realistic Theory].  
5 Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory, supra note 4. 
6 Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order 
(2016). 
7 Id. at 21. 
8 Id. at 164. 
9 Id. at 165. 
10 Ferzan, supra note 1, at 947. 
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 But what can we say about some of this context that Lacey highlights as crucial to the 
project of understanding responsibility? One natural focus of her critique would be the 
vectors of power that have constructed our social world in the UK (and elsewhere), such as 
class, race and gender, especially perhaps in chapter 3 of ISCR, where she discusses how 
criminal law is shaped by powerful interests, often those of the elite. And indeed, as 
discussed below, Lacey does, in various places in this text, suggest that these factors have 
played a part in the development of responsibility, but there is remarkably little space given 
to these important drivers and markers of social life, partly because, as she points out, 
interest-based analyses tend towards reductionism and monolithic notions of power (80). 
However, she also highlights the importance of not dismissing interests as a significant part 
of the structure of criminal responsibility (81).  
 There is a vast contemporary literature on the ways in which sex/gender, class, 
sexuality, physical ability and race work independently and together such that those of the 
“wrong” race and so forth become socially marginalized, and disproportionately appear 
within the criminal justice system. It is not clear from ISCR how the marginalization of 
“others” has shaped law generally or responsibility in particular. It is important then to 
explore the ways that markers of identity and often of repression, such as gender, class and 
race, have impacted upon the development of criminal law—and responsibility—both 
conceptually and in practice. However, in what follows, I will focus specifically on gender, 
since much of Lacey’s other work has analyzed the ways in which sex and gender operate to 
shape the conceptual and practical meaning of law.11  
 
II. Searching for Gender 
 
It is surely curious that gender, while figuring so centrally in the construction and 
organization of social life across virtually all societies and civilizations is nevertheless 
barely visible in the conceptual armoury of law.12 
 
Gender does not figure centrally in this book, even though Lacey points out that “one of the 
most radical changes in the conception of legal personhood, viewed in modern perspective 
[is] the relatively recent acknowledgement of women as legal persons” (183). Lacey explores 
how from the nineteenth century onwards, doctrines of mens rea and notions of responsibility 
as grounded in capacity gained ascendance, situated within the context of more general 
discourses of the individual, freely choosing subject, “premised on a very particular, modern 
construction of criminal law’s subjects as responsible agents” (139). The fact that the 
criminal law’s responsible subject has historically been male, is not the topic of this book, but 
                                                     
 
11 In doing so I do not mean to neglect the intersectional way in which people and 
communities are marginalised through race, class, sex/gender, physical ability and a myriad 
of other social characteristics. [Markus and Simon, have inserted this new footnote which has 
messed up the numbering of the ‘supra’ footnote references – I can fix this, but I didn’t want 
to do it without asking you first as you may prefer to do it through copy editing processes.  
Sorry!] 
12 Joanne Conaghan, Law and Gender 5 (2013). 
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that fact is certainly worth mentioning. Of course, this (male) liberal choosing subject who 
has opportunity and capacity is only one legal persona in the story of responsibility, as Lacey 
so skillfully demonstrates—notions of bad character, risk, and harmful outcomes, also drive 
the criminal responsibility practices of contemporary criminal law. However, none of these 
responsibility levers are understood in the text as specifically gendered either—though as 
suggested above, Lacey’s has, in previous analyses, revealed “the continued vitality of a 
cultural sense of women’s agency” within the process of criminalization throughout the 
nineteenth century.13 Clearly, as Naffine suggests in her review of Lindsay Farmer’s book, it 
is crucial that “[a] historical account of criminal law’s persons, as social beings, would need 
to acknowledge the very different social, economic and legal lives of men and women—as 
legal institutional facts; and then reflect on the implications for past and present criminal law: 
its interests and priorities and its very civility.”14  
 Near the beginning of ISCR Lacey lists the authors and texts that dominate the field 
of criminal law scholarship on responsibility (10), and the vast majority of those texts are 
written by men. It is not surprising then that her bibliography and footnotes refer mostly to 
male authors. Lacey does reference some female authors, as well as her own work, but 
largely that which deals with responsibility and criminalization, and only very minimally that 
which addresses gender. 
 That Lacey’s immediate points of reference are men, and that citations to the relevant 
texts in the field are to those by men, is not an accident. Lacey’s bibliography maps out the 
contours of the field as it is commonly understood to exist. In stark contrast to Lacey’s 
bibliography, which is dominated by white men, in Living a Feminist Life (LaFL),15 Sara 
Ahmed adopts a policy of citing no white men. What she means by this is that she does not 
cite those she sees as part of the academic institution of white men, that is, “the persistent 
structure or mechanism of social order governing the behaviour of a set of individuals within 
a given community.”16 Her aim is to challenge institutional habits—“tendencies are acquired 
through repetition”17—and the practice of only referring to those with whom we are already 
familiar, such that citational patterns repeat and reproduce themselves, and becomes 
inevitable.18 Ahmed is not a lawyer or a criminologist, but a feminist social theorist and 
activist, writing in LaFL about, amongst other things, the brick walls that feminist scholars 
come up against when trying to talk about or do equality-based work in the academy; her 
work here is helpful for the insights it brings to critical questions about the place or absence 
of gender in our academic conversations. 
 Replying to the question of why a reading list or bibliography is all white or all male 
with the answer, “of course, that’s just how it is” is what Ahmed calls “disciplinary 
fatalism.”19 The point is not to shame people or make them feel bad, she says, but to question 
                                                     
13 Lacey, supra note 2, at 105. 
14 Naffine, supra note 1.  
15 Sara Ahmed, Living a Feminist Life (2017). 
16 Id. at 153. 
17 Id. at 149. 
18 Id. at 150-51. 
19 Id. at 150. 
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the re-production of knowledge as (ir)relevant, and highlight the impact that reproduction 
has. As such, Ahmed’s citations do not simply reflect the field as it is (as if there was such a 
solid and immoveable fact as the field as it is); they are chosen to represent work that is 
relevant to her arguments, but not always cited, and to deliberately demonstrate the impact 
upon a text, and upon a reader, of the citations we choose (and those we do not). As long ago 
as 1987, Anne Bottomley raised the question of “whether the very construction, not only of 
legal discourse, but representations of the discourse in the academy is the product of 
patriarchal relations at the root of our society.”20 One way of addressing this is to use tools of 
feminist critique, which is itself a powerful resource of resistance “even where we do not 
have the means to radically change law schools and law itself.”21  
 In such a short book, which ambitiously aims to historicize responsibility, it is not 
possible for Lacey to “connect the dots” with other kinds of scholarship or the work of those 
outside the mainstream of this field. But for the remainder of this essay, I would like to 
undertake this task. It is important not only to connect the ideas in ISCR with Lacey’s own 
formidable gender analyses that appear elsewhere, most particularly in her 1998 book 
Unspeakable Subjects,22 but also to highlight the work of those theorists of gender and law 
for whom Lacey’s ideas can provide important points of resonance and contrast.  
 
III. Searching for Connections 
 
Ngaire Naffine’s book Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal 
Person23 (LMoL) makes some important arguments that clearly connect with Lacey’s in 
ISCR. Lacey does briefly reference Naffine’s work but it lies outside the mainstream criminal 
law theory scholarship on responsibility that Lacey directly engages in ISCR. But like Lacey, 
Naffine endeavors to excavate the competing influences on how we have come to understand 
a core legal concept—here personhood, or “the nature (and legitimacy) of law’s conception 
of its subject.” 24 Chapter 5 of LMoL, “Moral agents and responsibility,” examines the work 
of theorists who believe that it is the capacity for reason that makes one a legal person that 
can be held responsible. Unlike many legal theorists who start with the “What is Law?” 
question, chapter one of her book begins with the question “Who is Law for?.”. This is 
strongly echoed in Lacey’s own critical inquiry at the beginning of ISCR—that we should 
ask not what responsibility is so much as what it is for (2). It is the importance of what it 
means to be a person that is crucial for Naffine—because to be a person is “to have political 
and moral as well as legal standing”25 and that a legal person is “an act of legal creativity 
with immense social and political import.”26 It is not a merely a metaphysical question, but 
                                                     
20 Anne Bottomley, Feminism in Law Schools 12 (1987) (cited in Carol Smart, Feminism and 
the Power of Law 20 (1989) (emphasis added)). 
21 Id. at 25. 
22 Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (1998). 
23 Ngaire Naffine, Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal 
Person (2009). 
24 Id. at 13. 
25 Id. at 11. 
26 Id. at 12. 
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one that is deeply legal, as well as having religious and biological consequences. It has, she 
says, massive implications for social justice.27 Indeed, in her view, evaluating the 
appropriateness of a concept such as legal personhood—or, indeed, we might say 
responsibility—is not about whether it closely resembles reality, or accords with 
philosophical theory, but “how well it serves a just legal purpose,”28 i.e., how the concept is 
applied, and the outcome of that application.  
 In her book, Naffine examines competing views of human nature and what it means 
to be a person. In a way, this is a similar kind of question to “what is responsibility?,” but it 
appears almost as an a priori question—the question of capacity or character for example 
cannot be asked unless we ask whether or not the subject even counts as a human person. 
Lacey alludes to this in ISCR when she says:  
 
[I]n . . . the nineteenth century . . . an idea of responsibility as founded in freedom and 
capacities, coinciding as it did with an increasingly medicalized view of female 
deviance and an understanding of women as less rational, more feeble-minded, less 
autonomous, less fully citizens—indeed less persons—than men, may have had the 
ironic consequence that women became less often subject to criminal justice controls 
(57). 
 
Taking this brief thought one step further, we might ask, not simply what impact have ideas 
of responsibility had on women, but what impact has the idea of women, the idea of gender 
itself, had on the idea of responsibility? The answer of course might be, none at all—and if 
so, this is an important point in its own right, one that Lacey—in ISCR at least—does not 
address. As Conaghan has put it: “identifying the various ways in which gender acts upon 
and influences law is not the end of the matter. What is most interesting is that it consistently 
appears not to do so.”29 It is vital, therefore, at least to acknowledge the pressing question of 
the absence of gender, and the ways in which the concept of responsibility has been 
impervious to gender, how, as Conaghan says, “in the jurisprudential imagination, law 
occupies a self-consciously artificial and gender-devoid world.”30 Analytical jurisprudes may 
argue that responsibility is a gender-blind concept, but clearly being responsible is 
historically seen, as Lacey points out, as that which women are not. It is important to 
highlight then, that in this volume, Lacey’s brief treatment of the relationship between 
responsibility and gender demonstrates how femaleness acts as the negative against which we 
define responsibility - which by implication and default then, is always a male concept.  
 The notion of responsibility as founded in “freedom and capacities,” as Lacey 
mentions in the quote above, still has significance today—we need only look at the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales, section 74: “a person consents if he (sic) agrees by 
choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice.” The vast majority of those 
who make use of this provision are women. The consent provisions and the Act more 
                                                     
27 Id. at 11. 
28 Id. at 183 (emphasis in original). 
29 Conaghan, supra note 11, at 25. 
30 Id. at 5. 
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generally have been widely critiqued, but the question of why responsibility is, even now in 
2017, modelled on a liberal, rationalist—masculinist—model, needs to be addressed head-on: 
“After all, the concept of law (to invoke the title of Hart’s famous work) has been endlessly 
interrogated in terms which do not admit the relevance of gender.”31 Lacey herself points to 
this in Unspeakable Subjects32 when she says that the “structure and method” of law is 
gendered.33 There is nothing in ISCR that explicitly acknowledges the gendered history of 
responsibility itself—or indeed, ongoing questions about the way that it continues to be 
theorized in a male-dominated discipline. However, there are clear links between the ways in 
which Lacey understands responsibility to be constructed in and through ideas, interests and 
institutions, and her other published work on gender (and that of others). Placing ISCR into 
conversation with this other work allows us to engage in a more nuanced analysis of how 
some of those ideas, interests and institutions are, amongst other things, gendered, raced and 
classed. 
 For example, in chapter 6 of Unspeakable Subjects, entitled “Closure and Critique in 
Feminist Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both Camps?” Lacey 
raises methodological challenges similar to those suggested in ISCR—i.e., that legal theory 
must look beyond “pure” conceptual analyses of law if it is to have any purchase in the real 
world—but from a distinctly gender-sensitive perspective: “[I]t could be argued that feminist 
legal theory inevitably begs questions about the definition of law and the legal sphere which 
have been the stuff of analytical jurisprudence.”34 However, she points to the reluctance of 
most feminists to engage directly with traditional jurisprudence, and the failure of some 
feminists to recognize that traditional jurisprudence comes in various different shapes and 
sizes (natural law, positivism etc.), each of which raises distinct kinds of questions for 
feminist theory;35 the result is that core questions like “what is law” are often left to the 
analytical philosophers to “appropriate.” She ends the chapter with a strong call to arms: “We 
should not abandon the concept of jurisprudence to the orthodoxy, but claim it as our own as 
part of a transformative feminist practice.”36 
 Joanne Conaghan is an important interlocutor here for Lacey, particularly her most 
recent book, Law and Gender, which “considers understandings and conceptualizations of 
law in the jurisprudential imagination with a view to highlighting both the role of 
jurisprudence in the construction of a realm of the strictly legal and the gendered implications 
of so doing.”37 Lacey mentions the book in a footnote in the final chapter of ISCR, 
referencing Conaghan’s critique of general theories of law that neglect socio-political and 
cultural context. And Conaghan echoes some of Lacey’s concerns laid about above when she 
says, “[F]or the most part, legal scholarship continues to hold on to the view that gender 
                                                     
31 Id. at 6 (footnote omitted). 
32 Lacey, supra note 21. 
33 Id. at 2. 
34 Id. at 169. 
35 Id. at 170. 
36 Id. at 187. 
37 Conaghan, supra note 11, at 28. 
 9 
plays little or no role in the conceptual makeup, normative grounding, or categorical ordering 
of law.”38  
 Most feminist theories, influenced by postmodern critiques, would now accept that 
feminism alone is not sufficient to critique law.39 And it seems strange that meta-level 
Marxist and Feminist theories did not survive the challenge of postmodernism intact—critical 
theories must now at least acknowledge the intersecting nature of inequality if not reject 
explanatory theories all together—while much analytical jurisprudence asking the “What is 
law?” question seems to have emerged relatively unscathed, continuing to engage in vacuum-
based philosophical analyses of legal concepts. Similarly, Conaghan agrees that it is odd that 
mainstream jurisprudential scholarship remains “immune to the contamination” of 
contemporary feminist and critical legal theory: “Notwithstanding the wholesale assault of 
critical legal scholarship, the spirit of law as an intelligible and self-legitimating field of 
vision is remarkably resilient, still directing and informing much of the work produced by 
new generations of legal scholars. More importantly, it continues to have cultural and 
political purchase.” 40 
 On the other hand, Carol Smart argues that the quest for a distinctly feminist 
jurisprudence is misguided if—even while it challenges the form and substance of law—it 
“leaves untouched the idea that law should occupy a special place in ordering everyday 
life.”41 Something similar could be said specifically of criminal law too, of course. We may 
interrogate the foundational concepts and the substantive rules of criminal law, but this leaves 
untouched the central place of criminal law rules and concepts in our daily lives. 
Undermining the centrality of law—and indeed of criminalization42—in contemporary life is 
clearly not Lacey’s goal in ISCR, but Lacey does imply an over-expansive resort to criminal 
law when she discusses the increasing popularity of “risk” as a motivation for deeming 
someone criminally responsible and imposing criminal punishment (46-48); and the 
connections between “risk”- and “character”-based responsibility practices (148). 
 Smart’s rousing call to “resist the siren call of law” has been much debated in feminist 
literature (see for example the 2012 special issue of Feminist Legal Studies43), leaving some 
feminists conflicted about whether and to what extent engaging with law can really achieve 
feminist aims.44 As Lacey reminds us, it is crucial to remember that law also interacts with 
and is implicated in other powerful social, political, economic and cultural institutions45 and 
                                                     
38 Id. at 8. 
39 Lacey, supra note 21, at 13-14. 
40 Conaghan, supra note 11, at 16. 
41 Smart, supra note 19, at 5. 
42 There is a vast literature arguing against overcriminalization generally, and in relation to 
specific offenses. For discussion, see Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the 
Criminal Law (2008); Sharon Cowan, The Heart of the Matter: Criminalising Fraudulent 
Consent to Sex (unpublished, on file with author).  
43 Special Issue, Carol Smart’s Feminism and the Power of Law, 20 Fem. Leg. Stud. 65 
(2012). 
44 Sharon Cowan, Taking a Break from the Legal to Transform the Social, in Exploring the 
“Legal” in Socio-Legal Studies [AU: Please insert first page number] (2015). Page 121 
45 Lacey, supra note 21, at 175. 
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for that reason if no other, we cannot ignore law. But Smart’s main argument remains 
convincing here—that it is always dangerous to attempt to dismantle the master’s house using 
only the master’s tools. In other words, in trying to understand the key concepts of law, if we 
do not name the underlying norms, in this case gender norms, we risk masking “the operation 
of legal norms that produce problematic gendered consequences with a troubling degree of 
regularity.”46  
 For Smart, this means that feminists should not seek to transform jurisprudence by 
supplanting it with another “grand theory” of feminist jurisprudence—“replacing one 
hierarchy of truth with another,”47 since this does nothing to challenge the notion that there 
are universal and essential truths about law,48 and risks ignoring the fact that law is socially 
and historically contingent.49 A feminist jurisprudence project also potentially disregards the 
possibility of praxis, whereby theory and practice are dialogically situated, rather than theory 
being formulated simply by identifying the “truth” of experience.50 In other words, in 
theorizing about law, analytical jurisprudes may give too much weight to the abstract; 
feminists may give too much weight to the experiential. Smart seeks some sort of intellectual 
compromise in calling for feminist discourses and critiques.51 This neatly connects us back to 
Lacey’s methodology in ISCR of “reflexive movement” (202), between modality and 
functionality, that is, identifying core themes but avoiding universalism, and being cognizant 
of social contexts and institutions.  
 A more reflexive approach is also akin to what Sara Ahmed has recently suggested—
that feminism needs to embrace doubt and the necessity of “wavering with our convictions” 
since “[a] feminist movement that proceeds with too much confidence has cost us too much 
already.”52 This is very much an anti-universal truth approach. While Ahmed’s writing is 
grounded in her own experience, it has the element of praxis that Smart refers to. Feminist 
theory is not just something we generate in the academy, or in the office, Ahmed says, but 
something we do also “at home”;53 it is not something that is abstracted from empirical 
reality, but rather, “feminist theory is what we do when we live our lives in a feminist way.”54 
The particularities of our lives can be used to challenge the universal, to “bring theory back to 
life”55 so that feminist theory is both reflexive and accessible. Lacey’s book is not feminist 
theory, but it is reflexive and accessible, and is part of a conversation, with her own work and 
the work of others, about the importance of taking critical approaches to law—and life—
seriously. 
 
                                                     
46 Conaghan, supra note 11, at 28. 
47 Smart, supra note 19, at 89. 
48 Id. at 68. 
49 Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory, supra note 4, at 2. 
50 Smart, supra note 19, at 70 & 72. Lacey herself engages this debate on praxis in chapter 6 
of Unspeakable Subjects. See Lacey, supra note 21. 
51 Smart, supra note 19, at 69. 
52 Ahmed, supra note 14, at 7. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 11. 
55 Id. at 10. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Lacey’s impressive theory of criminal responsibility connects with a wider community of 
ideas; not simply ideas about responsibility (such as those of Lindsay Farmer) or law more 
generally (such as those of Tamanaha) or indeed legal theory from a feminist perspective (to 
which Smart, Naffine and Conaghan, to name a few, have developed). The question about the 
nature of law and the operation of its concepts in the real world draws in a broader range of 
interlocutors such as Sara Ahmed, because it is rooted in conversations about power, and 
about challenging dominant discourses, not only in theory, but also in academic institutions 
and practices themselves. As such, this book should be read as part of an important social 
dialogue about the need to contextualize concepts and to conceptualize contexts. 
